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Abstract
For Renaissance Aristotelian natural philosophers, ideally knowledge was certain and 
based on syllogistic demonstration. Many Italian scholars, such as Agostino Nifo, 
Pietro Pomponazzi, and Niccolò Cabeo, considered this ideal as inapplicable to the 
ﬁeld of meteorology. Rather, because of the accidental nature of meteorological phe-
nomena and the inherent irregularity of the weather, they believed that causal explana-
tions of meteorology were largely conjectural, provisional, and probabilistic. Several 
of these natural philosophers applied the standard of “saving the appearances” to the 
ﬁeld of meteorology because of the diﬃculties involved in making accurate observa-
tions. is lower epistemological standard contributed to the willingness of Aristote-
lians to revise meteorological theories and deviate from Aristotle’s own positions.
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Introduction 
e two dominating views of Renaissance Aristotelian epistemology 
or “scientiﬁc methodology” entail positions that are incompatible, 
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if not contradictory. e ﬁrst view holds that Aristotelians believed 
that their knowledge was complete and certain. Holders of this posi-
tion believe that Aristotle, and his later medieval and Renaissance 
commentators, equated natural philosophical knowledge with the 
logical methods found in the analytics, that used syllogism for a 
model of unequivocal demonstration. ese accounts begin with 
analyses of Aristotle,1 extend from Aristotle’s supposed view to his 
scholastic followers,2 and ﬁnd that the rejection of belief in the cer-
tainty of knowledge of the natural world to be crucial to the  Scientiﬁc 
Revolution.3 us according to this view, seventeenth-century  English 
experimentalists, in a climate of latitudinarianism, overturned their 
predecessors’ epistemology that used the demonstrative sciences as 
a model “to attain to the kind of certainty that compelled absolute 
assent.”4 Moreover, the insistence on certainty purportedly endorsed 
by Aristotelian natural philosophers is considered opposed not just 
to the new natural philosophies of the seventeenth century but also 
to the rhetorical traditions of Renaissance humanists that empha-
sized observation and contingent knowledge.5 
1) James Franklin, e Science of Conjecture (Baltimore, 2001), 166: “Aristotle argued 
for a rational search for certain causes in medicine as everywhere else.”
2) Peter Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and Its Ambitions, 
1500-1700 (Princeton, 2001), 5-6: “e lure of demonstrative certainty drew scho-
lastic natural philosophers to believe that they could make knowledge that was ana-
lytically solid.” Richard G. Olson, Science and Religion, 1450-1900: From Copernicus 
to Darwin (Baltimore, 2004), 90: “According to most Christian Aristotelian philoso-
phers including omas Aquinas, one should demand absolute certainty of any reli-
gious or natural scientiﬁc statement that commands assent.”
3) James R. Jacob, e Scientiﬁc Revolution: Aspirations and Achievements, 1500-1700 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1998), xiii: “e shift from an Aristotelian theory of knowl-
edge, which was conﬁdent of the truth of what we perceive, to a modern skepticism 
that doubts our capacity to know truth but nonetheless ﬁnds the resources, intellec-
tual and cultural to overcome pessimism and to insist that scientiﬁc knowledge is still 
attainable … .” 
4) Steven Shapin and Simon Schaﬀer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and 
the Experimental Life (Princeton, 1985), 23-24
5) Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study 
of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature 
(Princeton, 1983), 3-14.
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e second view, which stems from the groundbreaking work of 
ﬁrst Ernst Cassirer and then John Herman Randall, Jr., stresses the 
importance of the method called regressus, which combined new 
observationally based discovery of causes (demonstratio quia or me -
thodus resolutiva) with the certainty of syllogism in producing theo-
retical explanations (demonstratio propter quid or methodus compositiva).6 
Using this model of method, natural signs, experience, and obser-
vations lead to the hypothetical determination of the causes of eﬀects, 
by what Averroes termed demonstratio signi or “demonstrations from 
signs.” en by an intellective negotiatio, conﬁdence in the hypo-
thetical causes increases. Finally, the causes can then be utilized to 
explain the eﬀects in a certain demonstration. us, regressus method 
allows for the possibility of change and progress in natural philo-
sophical knowledge and a place for hypothetical understandings of 
nature without rejecting the possibility of syllogistic demonstration. 
e possibility of change means that the results are not certain but 
rather provisional, especially for knowledge that has resulted only 
from the ﬁrst stage of the procedure, the demonstratio signi.
While the combination of all three parts of the regressus was 
intended to bring about certainty or near certainty, the realization 
of this goal was not always possible because of the contingent, i.e., 
accidental, nature or diﬃculty of the subject. Paolo Palmieri notes 
for example that Giacomo Zabarella, one of the leading proponents 
of and contributors to the regressus theory, did not apply the the-
ory in his textbook, De rebus naturalibus.7 Zabarella, however, and 
many other Renaissance natural philosophers followed the ﬁrst stage 
of the regressus in their discussions of meteorology, a ﬁeld that rec-
ommended itself to demonstratio signi because of Aristotle’s explicit 
use of signs in his own considerations of meteorological  phenomena. 
e ﬁrst stage of the regressus was not taken to be deﬁnitive or cer-
tain but rather was provisional. Agostino Nifo, a natural  philosopher 
6) Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der neueren Zeit (Berlin, 1922), 136-144; 
John Herman Randall, Jr., “e Development of Scientiﬁc Method in the School of 
Padua,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 1 (1940), 177–206; John Herman Randall, Jr., 
e School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961).
7) Paolo Palmieri, “Science and Authority in Giacomo Zabarella,” History of Science 45 
(2007), 404-427, esp. 418. 
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who wrote on logic as well as meteorology, described the discovery 
of causes through natural eﬀects, a method he took to be typical 
of the natural philosophy, as “conjectural.”8
An examination of Italian Renaissance Aristotelian meteorology, 
from Agostino Nifo to Niccolò Cabeo, demonstrates that Aristote-
lians saw many theories about nature as provisional and at times 
instrumental. Just as Robert Boyle and other later experimentalists 
are said to have believed, they thought that their “physical hypoth-
eses were provisional and revisable” in addition to being “removed 
from the realm of the demonstrative.”9 inkers including Nifo, 
Pietro Pomponazzi, and Lodovico Boccadiferro applied the ideal of 
“saving the appearances” not just to astronomical theory but also 
to explanations of changes within the sublunary region. While 
epistemic goals and standards varied among thinkers, a number of 
them consciously followed at least the ﬁrst stage of the regressus the-
ory, the demonstration of the fact, in their attempts to establish 
hypothetical understandings of the causes of weather. Many were 
fully aware of the uncertainty of their ﬁndings and enunciated the 
provisional nature of their theories. is does not mean, however, 
that they were anticipating or applying the modern scientiﬁc method 
or Baconian induction. Rather their views were ﬁrmly based in 
Renaissance ideals of demonstration and dialectic based on experi-
ence, Aristotelian textual analysis, and the utilization of signs. 
Aristotle’s Meteorology
Aristotelian meteorology, as opposed to astro-meteorology, was pri-
marily causal in its goals, not predictive. For Aristotle, knowledge 
of the causes of many meteorological subjects was based not on 
 syllogistic deduction but was the result of interpreting signs that 
helped to conﬁrm the hypothesis that meteorological phenomena 
result from two exhalations that circulate in the sublunary region. 
8) Agostino Nifo, Expositio super octo Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de physico auditu, 
( Venice, 1552), fol. 6v.
9) Shapin and Schaﬀer, Leviathan and the Air-pump, 24. 
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 Aristotle himself was aware of the impossibility of a uniﬁed method 
for all learning, and proposed a prohibition on μετάβασις, the use 
of content from one ﬁeld to explain another.10 us, he contended 
that while mathematics was appropriate for discussions of astron-
omy and optics, in other messier ﬁelds, the objects of science could 
not be known through such tools. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aris-
totle speciﬁed that all ﬁelds of philosophy cannot be expected to 
achieve the same level of precision (τὸ ἀκριβής). Rather, the degree 
of certainty is determined, at least partially, by the nature of the 
subjects under scrutiny. us ﬁelds that rely on opinion and uncer-
tain premises can at best provide probable conclusions and approx-
imations to the truth (τύπῳ τἀληθὲς).11 
While in the Ethics Aristotle urged investigators to expect degrees 
of exactness proportional to the subject at hand, in the Topics he 
detailed two kinds of logical proof that diﬀer in terms of certainty: 
demonstration (ἡ ἀπόδειξις) and dialectic. Demonstration, the more 
certain of the two, is a deductive argument based on “true and 
primitive” premises that are convincing in and of themselves; dia-
lectic starts with reputable opinions, that is, opinions that if not 
acceptable to everyone at least are endorsed by most wise people. 
Demonstration provided scientia, proven knowledge, while dialec-
tic yielded verisimilitude. In the words of recent commentators, dia-
lectic “could oﬀer only conjectural premises and probable conclusions,” 
no matter how accurate or truthful they seemed.12 us Renaissance 
thinkers typically understood dialectic as a discussion of probabil-
ity, that is, a consideration of likelihoods. By the sixteenth century, 
scholars had added a third category of argument, namely persua-
sion, which was rhetorical in its nature and even less certain than 
dialectic. Acknowledgement of these three categories, demonstra-
tion, probability, and persuasion, was so widespread that it was 
common to, in the words of Richard Serjeantson, “every natural 
10) Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 75a38-75b6.
11) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b13-27. 
12) Jean Dietz Moss and William A. Wallace, Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Time of 
 Galileo (Washington, D.C., 2003), 16.
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philosopher educated to any level beyond that of rudimentary Latin 
grammar.”13
While recognition of the categories of demonstration, probabil-
ity, and persuasion was nearly universal, it was less clear which cat-
egory should be applied to which subjects. Meteorology, however, 
was a particularly good candidate for dialectical or probable argu-
ments for a number of reasons. For one, Aristotle’s approach was 
dialectical throughout the Meteorology. He considered and largely 
rejected the opinions (τὰ ἔνδοξα) of the Presocratics in addition 
to admitting the relative strengths of the adopted positions.14 Sec-
ond, some Renaissance omists believed that certain knowledge 
(scientia) was restricted to metaphysical topics while opinion (opinio) 
applied to the physical world, and thus also to meteorology.15 e 
lower epistemic standard was used for natural knowledge in part 
because the regularity of nature is only “for the most part,” accord-
ing to Aristotle. In particular, matter and its accidents, as opposed 
to substances, are contingent, that is, are not necessary, accidental, 
and “capable of being otherwise than as it for the most part is.”16 
Aristotle went on to explain in the Posterior Analytics that non-
essential attributes, or accidental qualities, because of the absence 
of their necessity, are not subject to necessary proofs or demonstra-
tive knowledge (ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική).17 e contention that the 
non-essential does not admit to demonstration but rather to dia-
lectic or probable argumentation is crucial to Renaissance meteo-
rology because of the widely-held belief that most meteorological 
phenomena involve not substances or essential natures per se but 
rather imperfect mixtures of the elements. If meteorology deals with 
13) R.W. Serjeantson, “Proof and Persuasion,” in e Cambridge History of Science: Vol-
ume 3 Early Modern Science, ed. Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park (Cambridge, 
2006), 139-140.
14) Cynthia Freeland, “Scientiﬁc Explanation and Empirical Data in Aristotle’s Meteo-
rology,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990), 62-107.
15) Serjeantson, “Proof and Persuasion,” 139.
16) Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI.2, 1027a12, Trans. W.D. Ross.
17) Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.6, 75a19-22. 
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accidental formations of the elements then it stands to reason that 
any understanding of the ﬁeld is only probable.18
Aristotle realized the diﬃculty of making comprehensive and accu-
rate determinations of meteorology. According to Aristotle, meteo-
rology strives to explain changes in the sublunary world, including 
the area above the earth as well as below. e key word is “strives.” 
e phenomena of this region are natural, but necessarily irregular, 
particularly in comparison to the celestial region.19 Because of their 
natural irregularity, a limited conﬁdence in the ability to give true 
explanations is called for. Aristotle wrote: “Of all these phenomena, 
some we ﬁnd inexplicable, others we can to some extent understand.”20 
Gaining a good account of meteorological phenomena is hampered 
not only by their irregularity but also by their inaccessibility to the 
senses. Before giving his explanation for comets, Aristotle, in a state-
ment that can reasonably be thought to apply to large portions of 
the Meteorology, wrote: “We consider that we have given a suﬃ-
ciently rational explanation of things inaccessible to observation by 
our senses if we have produced a theory (λόγος) that is possible.”21 
us the goal was to provide a “possible” account rather than a 
“certain” one. 
Matter eory, Uncertainty, and Meteorology
A number of Renaissance treatments of Aristotle’s Meteorology not 
only accepted his claims that meteorological knowledge is limited 
but used matter theory to explain why. ese explanations were 
based on two principles: 1) meteorological phenomena result from 
imperfect mixtures, which do not possess substantial forms; and 2) 
the matter of the terrestrial or sublunary realm is unstable and rel-
atively unknowable. 
18) For similar arguments as applied in Renaissance medicine see Ian Maclean, Logic, 
Signs and Nature (Cambridge, 2002), 132.
19) Aristotle, Meteorology, 338b1-3.
20) Ibid., 339a3-4. Tr. H.D.P. Lee (Cambridge, MA, 1952), 5.
21) Ibid., 344a5-7. Tr. Lee, 49.
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e idea that the ﬁrst three books of the Meteorology treated 
imperfect mixture goes back at least to Albertus Magnus who described 
the subject of these books as phenomena that are in the state of 
becoming a simple substance.22 John Buridan was one of the earli-
est to use the term “imperfect mixtures” to categorize meteorolog-
ical substrata in contrast to “perfect mixtures” such as ﬂesh, blood, 
milk, and metals, for which Meteorology IV gives an account.23 Renais-
sance Aristotelians followed Buridan’s phrasing almost uniformly. 
e acceptance of meteorological substrata as “imperfect” contrib-
uted to the idea that meteorological knowledge is probable. If mete-
orology considers objects that are without their own substantial 
forms, knowledge of formal causes will be limited. Indeed meteo-
rology most often referred to the forms of the elements that com-
posed the two exhalations, which were the material and eﬃcient 
causes of meteorological eﬀects. Francesco Piccolomini, a professor 
at Padua during the last decades of the sixteenth century, explicitly 
expressed this view: “e form that is a substance is not properly 
suited to meteors, because they are imperfect mixtures, which are 
of such a type, that they will not create new forms; therefore their 
substantial form is not distinct from those of the elements.”24 As a 
result, scholars were limited in the kinds of formal and ﬁnal cau-
sation that could be used to understand meteorology.
Although Renaissance commentators did not uniformly claim there 
were no formal or ﬁnal causes for meteorological phenomena, the 
rejection of the existence of those causes was frequent. For exam-
ple, Francesco Vimercati and Jacob Schegk speciﬁcally argued that 
the two causes of meteorological phenomena are eﬃcient and mate-
rial causes; and the Coimbrans’ commentary contended that “mete-
ors” do not have their own formal causes and made little mention 
22) Albertus Magnus, Liber quartus meteororum, in Opera, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), 
IV: 705. 
23) John Buridan, Expositio libri meteororum, Ms. Vaticana lat. 2162, f. 103r. 
24) Francesco Piccolomini, Librorum ad scientiam de natura attinentium pars quarta. In 
qua Meteorologica explicantur et connexa cum eis (Venice, 1596), fol. 4v “Forma, quae 
Substantia sit, proprie Metheoris non competit, quia sunt mixta imperfecta, quae  huius 
sunt conditionis, ut nova non prodierint, ideo forma Substantialis non est  distincta ab 
ea Elementorum.”
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of ﬁnal causes.25 Eﬀectively, the idea that the end of a substance 
was the realization of its form was ruled out, leaving only external 
ﬁnal causes available for meteorology for those who believed that 
ﬁnal causes do indeed exist for meteorology. e character of mete-
orological phenomena thus eliminated the possibility of a deep knowl-
edge of their formal and ﬁnal causes, the two most privileged types 
of causes for Aristotelians.
e Renaissance conception of the imperfection of meteorologi-
cal phenomena was an amalgam of the Aristotelian ideas of potency 
and act and Platonic views of matter, that had held currency through-
out the Middle Ages. In the Timaeus, Plato contrasted the matter 
of the sublunary world with the forms. Forms are perfect, unchang-
ing, and the source of knowledge. To the contrary matter is the 
source of imperfection in the world because of its instability. Mate-
rial necessity is the “errant” cause.26 As a result, understandings of 
the material world are necessarily as transitory as its contents, and 
the Timaeus puts forth only a “likely” explanation, which is the best 
we can hope for.27 Plato’s belief that matter is the source of uncer-
tainty or natural imperfection ran through the Augustinian tradi-
tion and emerged in other loci of medieval and Renaissance 
scholasticism. Averroes in his commentary on the Posterior Analyt-
ics wrote, “matter is the reason that that which is per accidens is 
found in the sciences. And what is per accidens is a great distance 
from truth … erefore, it is necessary that the matter is less true.”28 
omas Aquinas expressed a similar view in his commentaries on 
Aristotelian logic, where he contended that uncertainty is  correlative 
25) Jacob Schegk, In reliquos naturalium Aristotelis libros Commentaria (Basel, 1550), 
335; Francesco Vimercati, In quatuor libros Aristotelis Meteorologicorum commentarii 
(Paris, 1556), 18; Collegium Conimbricense, In libros Meteororum Aristotelis Stagiri-
tae (Cologne, 1603), 5.
26) Plato, Timaeus, 47e-48e. 
27) Plato, Timaeus, 29b-c. 
28) Averroes, In librum Aristotelis de demonstratione maxima expositio, in Aristotelis 
 Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venice, 1572-1576 ; reprt. Frankfurt am Main, 
1962), I, 2, fol. 375r: “materia est causa, quod inveniatur in scientiis id, quod est per 
accidens: et quod est per accidens est magna elongatio a veritate … oportet igitur ut 
materia sit minus vera … .”
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to matter’s instability: “Uncertainty is caused by the transmutabil-
ity of sensible matter; thus however much it approaches it [mat-
ter], knowledge (scientia) is less certain.”29 ese views were 
inﬂuential in logical works even up to the 1590s, when Zabarella 
cited them to give authority to his similar position.30 e practical 
ramiﬁcations of this Platonic conception of matter, however, are 
evident not in the works on logic and method but in meteorolog-
ical discourse, because of its overwhelming concern with material 
causes.
Simone Porzio, a professor at Pisa in the 1540s and 50s best 
known for his defense of the materiality of the human intellect,31 
gave an account of the epistemological basis for the natural sciences 
in his treatise, De rerum naturalium principiis. In the section that 
considers meteorology, Porzio considered the immediate eﬃcient 
causes of simple and composite substances. Simple substances can 
be known according to a formula (ratio) because they are constant 
by nature. Diﬃculties, however, emerge in attempting to explain 
particular composites or mixtures because they arise out of matter 
that is indeterminate. ese mixtures are accidental and lack a spe-
ciﬁc cause; their necessity is internal rather than the necessity of 
universal eﬃcient causes, such as the sun. us, Porzio contended 
that natural philosophical arguments that move “from eﬃcient causes 
to their eﬀects are not the most powerful (potissimae) because the 
eﬀects can be impeded by the indetermination of the matter, which 
can receive multiple and various forms.”32 For Porzio, the plasticity 
29) omas Aquinas, In Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum analyticorum exposi-
tio, ed. Raimondo M. Spiazzi (Rome,1964), lib. I, lect. 41, n. 358: “… incertitudo 
causatur propter transmutabilitatem materiae sensibilis; inde quanto magis acceditur 
ad eam, tanto scientia est minus certa.”
30) Luigi Olivieri, Certezza e gerarchi del sapere: Crisi dell’idea di scientiﬁcità nell’aris-
totelismo del secolo xvi (Padua, 1983), 67-69.
31) Simone Porzio, De humana mente, disputatio (Florence, 1551).
32) Simone Porzio, De rerum naturalium principiis (Naples, 1553), fol. Riiv-Riiir: 
“Verum respectu aliquorum, ut puta quarundam elementorum aﬀectionum, quas in 
libro Meteorum alias enarravimus, est causa particularis, hoc est, est proxima & im-
mediata eﬃciens causa: … Atque iccirco in rebus naturalibus demonstrationes a cau-
sis eﬃcientibus ad suos eﬀectus non sunt potissimae: quia eﬀectus impediri queant, ob 
materiae indeterminationem, quae varias multiplicesque formas recipere potest.”
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of matter makes knowledge of composites uncertain and proofs 
stemming from eﬃcient causes are less than certain. Even though 
Porzio’s conclusion potentially applies to many ﬁelds within natu-
ral philosophy, it is especially pertinent to meteorology because of 
the signiﬁcant role that matter holds in explanations of this ﬁeld.
Saving the Appearances: Probable, Possible, and Provisional 
Knowledge
e lack of certainty about meteorological phenomena did not ren-
der the ﬁeld hopeless. Rather honest assessments of the character 
of meteorological theory were needed, as was recognized well before 
the Renaissance. Avempace (Ibn Bājja), for example, compared the 
ﬁeld of meteorology to mathematical astronomy, which he believed 
had progressed in recent years, “we have now more principles from 
mathematical astronomy than in any preceding time.” In compari-
son, meteorological subjects are “diﬃcult” because “the principles 
we have are not suﬃcient,” but that should not lead us to reject 
natural science altogether, rather “there is no reason to give no 
account at all; therefore, let us give an account insofar as we are 
enabled to do it by the principles we have found.”33 A modest assess-
ment of the possibility and degree of knowledge in meteorology is 
required until better principles are uncovered. While a critic of a 
number of aspects of Avempace’s natural philosophy, Averroes in 
his meteorological works agreed concerning the limited epistemic 
character of meteorology. In his discussion of the Milky Way, Aver-
roes argued that because there are doubts about the genus of the 
Milky Way, our knowledge of its causes should be considered “pos-
sible” and our understanding diminished (cognitio diminuta).34 e 
acceptance of limitations was no hindrance to speculation about 
33) Paul Lettinck, ed. and trans., Aristotle’s Meteorology and its Reception in the Arab 
World: With an Edition and translation of Ibn Suwār’s Treatise on Meteorological Phe-
nomena and Ibn Bājja’s Commentary on the Meteorology (Leiden, 1999), 399
34) Averroes, In quatuor Meteorologicorum Aristotelis libros in Aristotelis Opera, V, fol. 
414r: “Accidit autem huic cognitioni in substantia Galasiae esse cognitionem diminu-
tam: propterea quod genus illius est ignotum esse per se.”
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causes as long as we recognize that they are only possible; thus, 
Averroes oﬀered two separate possibilities for the causes of the ﬂick-
ering Milky Way: the weakness of our eyes causes it because of the 
distance of small stars; or, a place in the skies receives and multi-
plies the light of the stars.
e views of Averroes resonated during the Renaissance. Pietro 
Pomponazzi expressed skepticism about the possibility of complete 
knowledge of the natural world, using our inability to understand 
meteorological phenomena as evidence for the limitation of human 
knowledge. In his De incantationibus, a work dedicated to giving 
potential explanations for strange and seemingly miraculous events, 
for prodigies, including fountains and statues that drip blood, or 
for bizarre meteorological events chronicled in histories, such as the 
time it rained wool, he conceded that an epistemological standard 
below certainty was appropriate. In the introductory pages of De 
incantationibus, he claimed that some Peripatetics used demons to 
explain the intractable, not only because demons are posited by 
“ecclesiastical decrees,” but also because their presumed existence 
allows us to “save many phenomena.”35 e employment of demons 
in natural philosophy is thus instrumental, parallel to epicycles and 
eccentrics that save the phenomena in astronomy. While Pompon-
azzi rejected demons, he did not reject the idea that naturalistic 
explanations are meant to save the appearances. Citing Averroes’ 
commentary on the De caelo and Aristotle’s Topics, Pomponazzi 
argued “that in diﬃcult and hidden matters, the answers more 
removed from inconveniences, and more consonant with sensations 
and reason, are to be better received than contrary arguments.”36 As 
a result, Pomponazzi’s controversial claim that the miraculous events 
35) Pietro Pomponazzi, De naturalium eﬀectuum causis sive de incantationibus (Basel, 
1567; reprint Hildesheim, 1970), 6. For saving the appearances in Pomponazzi see 
Ian Maclean, “Heterodoxy in Natural Philosophy and Medicine: Pietro Pomponazzi, 
Guglielmo Gratarolo, Girolamo Cardano,” in Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and 
Religion, ed. John Brooke and Ian Maclean (Oxford, 2005), 1-29, esp. 15-16;  Franco 
Graiﬀ, “I prodigi e l’astrologia nei commenti di Pietro Pomponazzi al De caelo, alla 
Meteora e al De generatione,” Medioevo 2 (1976), 331-361, esp. 331-332.
36) Pomponazzi, De incantationibus, 130-131. For raining wool see Pliny, Historia nat-
uralis, II, 57.
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recounted in scripture “can on the surface be reduced to natural 
causes”37 need not be taken as an endorsement of the view that the 
events actually were the result of natural causes alone but rather as 
support of the more modest claim that natural causes can give an 
explanation that potentially conforms to our experiences and rea-
soning.
Pomponazzi further considered epistemology and the natural world 
in his In libros Meteororum (ca.1522), a work that discusses these 
diﬃcult and hidden matters. In this work he contended that Aris-
totle at times adopted the epistemological standard of verisimilitude 
and employed rhetorical arguments in natural philosophy. As a result, 
Pomponazzi conceded that saving the appearances was an appropri-
ate ideal for natural philosophy. 
In a dubium dedicated to Meteorology 2.1, he addressed the degree 
of knowledge and certainty that can be ascribed to meteorological 
subjects as he tried to make sense of a passage of the Meteorology 
that confounded and contradicted his own experience of the natu-
ral world. In this passage, Aristotle attempted to explain the sources 
that create various kinds of bodies of water. He divided the kinds 
of bodies of fresh water into two types: standing and running. Run-
ning water, such as rivers and streams, comes from sources that are 
higher than the stream or river. Standing water, however, is of two 
types. Typically, standing water naturally comes from the accumu-
lation of rain water and is static; the relevant examples are lakes 
and swamps. According to Aristotle, standing water that comes from 
underground sources only does so when artiﬁcially created, such as 
in the case of wells. is last statement, which Pomponazzi found 
problematic, does not appear to have been a slip of the Stagirite, 
as it appears twice. Aristotle wrote: “Some [standing water] springs 
from sources, but is always made to do so artiﬁcially (χειρόκμητα), 
as for instance the water in wells.” And two lines later wrote: “Hence 
water in streams and rivers runs of its own accord (αὐτόματα), 
but well-water needs an artiﬁcial construction (τέχνης ἐργασομέ-
νης).”38
37) Pomponazzi, De incantationibus, 81.
38) Aristotle, Meteorology, 353b25-29. Trans. Lee, 127.
278 C. Martin / Early Science and Medicine 14 (2009) 265-289
Pomponazzi found the contention that all standing springs or 
wells must be artiﬁcial untenable: “this is contra experimentum¸ as 
many from the schools have told me they have seen, and I myself 
have seen, many springs and natural wells.”39 After rejecting the 
interpretation attributed to omas Aquinas, which was shared by 
Gaetano of iene and “all of the Latins [he] had seen,” because 
this view, although in agreement with Aristotle, was not in accor-
dance with reason and experience, and after dismissing Alexander’s 
view, which he said was also false, Pomponazzi tried to determine 
why Aristotle believed as he did. He speculated that perhaps “in 
Aristotle’s country all stationary bodies of water are man-made,” 
although in his own “regions this is not the case.”40 But his con-
clusion was that Aristotle’s view is “probable and does not 
demonstrate.”41 More strongly he contended that “in my judgment 
Aristotle’s theory is without value.” e only way Pomponazzi found 
to make sense of Aristotle was to lower the epistemological stan-
dard that Aristotle used to reach this theory. It is not one of dem-
onstration as found in the Analytics but rather closer to the standards 
of a rhetorical argument:
I do not wish to seem rash for I do not say this because I wish to reprehend the 
words of Aristotle, yet without blaming it is conceded to me and licit to doubt 
about this matter. For in my view Aristotle’s position is without value. I know how 
to respond to this position [i.e., Aristotle’s] even if I do not know it [i.e., the cor-
rect position] and I would like to respond to it. Perhaps it should be said that Aris-
totle does not proﬀer this position as a demonstration and necessary proof but in 
order that it be some likely persuasion. For it seems that the sea could not arise 
from springs by the method that Aristotle posits but does not demonstrate. I 
should say that Aristotle did not posit it as a demonstration. [His position] is valid 
according to verisimilitude, not by [his] advancing [it] absolutely. For in  advancing 
39) Pomponazzi, In libros Meteororum , Ms. Biblioteca Ambrosiana R. 96 sup., fol. 
49r: “Et hoc est contra experientiam; nam, ut multi ex scolaribus mihi dixerunt vid-
isse, et ego ipse vidi multos fontes et puteos stantes naturales naturaliter neque aliquo 
artis ministerio.”
40) Ibid., fol. 50r: “sed forsan in patria Arist[otelis] ita erat quod omnes aquae statio-
nariae erant manufactae. In nostris tamen regionibus non ita est.” 
41) Ibid., fol. 49v: “Hoc autem est probabile, et non demonstrat.”
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it absolutely, it would be false. But Aristotle has assumed it not absolutely, but for 
the most part.42
Pomponazzi thus contended that Aristotle for many topics argued 
not absolutely but with likely persuasion or according to verisimil-
itude. ese many topics included others discussed in the Meteo-
rology, where Aristotle seems to have made the claim that he could 
not use demonstrative proof because of the inaccessibility and irreg-
ularity of many meteorological eﬀects.
Pomponazzi resumed this discussion of the epistemology of mete-
orology in another dubium in which he addressed Aristotle’s theory 
of the formation of typhoons. According to this theory typhoons 
result when two winds collide in a cloud. e weaker wind is thrust 
aside and begins to move in circular motion, just as an eddy does 
in water. Pomponazzi asked simply: How did Aristotle know typhoons 
are formed in such away “when he was neither above the clouds 
nor was he able to see them generated?” e answer depends on 
the relatively lower standard of demonstration for natural phenom-
ena inaccessible to the senses. Citing the ﬁrst book of the Nico-
machean Ethics, where Aristotle held that one cannot expect the 
same level of demonstration in ethical matters as one ﬁnds in math-
ematics, Pomponazzi suggested “that as much should be expected 
by the auditor as the treated material allows.” e natural world 
deﬁes complete explanation, while metaphysics can admit certain 
demonstration: 
In natural things we cannot have demonstration semper sic … since no one can 
know these diurna superiora. For we are like manual workers, and God truly is as 
42) Ibid., fol. 50r: “Nollem ego videri temerarius. nam haec non dico ut velim dicta 
Arist. reprehendere. sed tamen circa illa absque reprehensione mihi concessum et lici-
tum est dubitare; nam meo iudicio ratio Aristo. nullius est valoris. Ad hanc rationem 
scio ego respondere nec eam novi, et [ut written above] respondere velim. forsan dicen-
dum est, quod Ar. non protulit hanc rationem pro demonstratione et necessaria proba-
tione, sed ut esset quaedam persuasio. Verisimile enim videtur quod non possit mare a 
fontibus ortum trahere. Ratione illa quam ponit Ar[istoteles] non autem demonstrat. 
id dicerem Aristotelem non potuisse pro demonstratione. Valet ergo a verisimili, non 
absolute proferendo. absolute enim proferendo falsa esset. Sed Ar[istoteles] assumpsit 
eam ut in pluribus non absolute.”
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Architect, we can make artiﬁcial things and not natural, and in this science [i.e., 
meteorology] we can have demonstration and certitude in so far as we can, not 
however as [we can] in metaphysics.
Rather the standard for much of the impermanent natural world is 
“saving the appearances.” Pomponazzi thus concluded that: “but 
because Aristotle is further from contradiction, therefore his words 
are tested in natural things.”43 Many discussions of the natural world 
and therefore discussions of meteorology are evaluated not by strict 
standards of syllogistic proof but rather by their consistency with 
experience and free from internal contradiction.
Agostino Nifo agreed with Pomponazzi, his rival and contempo-
rary, that theories in meteorology should attempt only to save the 
appearances because of the indetermination of matter combined 
with concerns over the possibility of accurate sensation and the lim-
its of human comprehension of natural subjects. In a short treatise 
on the causes of catastrophes printed in 1505, he considered and 
rejected the possibility of accurately predicting meteorological catas-
trophes through diagnoses of air because of the near inﬁnite num-
ber of mixtures, each with a diﬀerent temperament. “To explain 
how so many signs from mixtures occur is laborious and perhaps 
beyond human capabilities.” us only an empiricism based on 
observation, not on matter theory, can aid in predicting future  natural 
43) Ibid., fol. 84r: “Alia dubitatio satis trivialis: quomodo scivit Aristoteles tiphonem 
illo modo contrarium, cum non fuerit supra nubem, nec viderit eum generari. No-
tetis quod tantum petendum est ab auditore, quantum concedit materia tractata: et 
clare habetur primo Aethic. [i.e., Nicomachean Ethics] et in meth. [i.e., the Metaphys-
ics]. In rebus naturalibus non possumus habere demonstrationem semper sic, ut dixi -
mus in lib. de Anima, meth., autem prius, Quoniam nemo possit scire illa diurna 
 superiora. Nos enim sumus ut manuales, Deus vero ut Architectus, possumus enim 
nos facere artiﬁcialia non autem naturalia, unde in hac scientia possumus habere de-
monstrationem, et certitudinem eo modo quo possumus, non autem ut in meth. Sed 
quia Aristoteles remotior est a contradictione, ideo sua dicta in naturalibus proban-
tur.” For Pomponazzi’s claims of using an uncertain method in other works see: 
Stefano Perfetti, “Docebo vos dubitare. Il commento inedito di Pietro Pomponazzi al 
De partibus animalium (Bologna 1521-24),” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione ﬁloso-
ﬁca medievale 10 (1999), 439-66; Francesco Paolo Raimondi, “Pomponazzi’s Criti-
cism of Swineshead and the Decline of the Calculatory Tradition in Italy,” Physis n.s. 
37 (2000), 311-358, esp. 326.
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disasters.44 Similar doubts were common to critiques of medical 
diagnosis and astrological prediction, ﬁelds that potentially consid-
ered an inﬁnite number of combinations of complexions and inﬂu-
ences.45 In any case, in his commentary on the Meteorology that was 
ﬁrst printed in 1523, Nifo went even further, conceding that the 
ﬁeld of meteorology is not a science in itself (in se) because of the 
irregularity of meteorological phenomena and “also because the ele-
mentary causes, from which these [meteorological] phenomena arise, 
act contingently and are acted upon contingently.”46 e indeter-
minate nature of matter coupled with the diﬃculty of observing 
many meteorological phenomena led Nifo to conclude that the stan-
dard of meteorological knowledge required that the accounts were 
coherent rather than certain in a strict sense. 
Because we think we have suﬃciently given demonstration about eﬀects unclear 
to the senses according to theory (secundum rationem) if we reduce those appear-
ances to the possible, that is, to such a certainty to which what is impossible does 
not follow.47 
In his treatment of Aristotle’s Physics, Nifo, basing himself on his 
reading of the Meteorology, expanded this judgment to all of natu-
ral science, which he says is not a scientia simpliciter such as math-
ematics because “it does not treat the true causes of natural eﬀects, 
but only in so far as they are possible through conjecture.”48
44) Agostino Nifo, De nostrarum calamitatum causis liber ad Oliverium Carafam 
( Venice, 1505), fol. 18r: “Explicare quot e mixtionibus contingant signiﬁcationes la-
boriosum est: et fortasse supra captum humanum: quapropter observatoribus pen-
sitanda relinquimus.” 
45) For medicine, see Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature, 134. 
46) Agostino Nifo, In libris Aristotelis Meteorologicis commentaria (Venice, 1540), fol. 
2r: “Tum etiam quia cause elementarie e quibus, hec proﬁciscuntur, contingenter 
agunt, et contingenter patiuntur.”
47) Nifo, In Meteorologicorum, fol. 26v: Quoniam autem de eﬀectibus sensui im-
manifestis putamus suﬃcienter demonstrasse secundum rationem si ostensa de his 
reduxerimus ad possibilem, hoc est ad talem certitudinem, ad quam non sequantur 
impossibilia.”
48) Agostino Nifo, Expositio super octo Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de Physico auditu 
( Venice, 1552), fol. 6v: “Dicendum, scientiam de natura non esse scientiam  simpliciter, 
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A similar skepticism toward the possibility of certain knowledge 
of meteorology is found in Tiberio Russiliano’s Apologeticus adver-
sus culcullatos (1519), a work that applied physical causes to both 
the foundations of Christian dogma and to what was traditionally 
understood as miraculous. Russiliano, a former student of Nifo, in 
a quaestio in which he put forth the argument that according to 
philosophical arguments there must have been an inﬁnite number 
of universal ﬂoods, considered his argument “demonstrative and 
unassailable,” but only if his suppositions are accepted. He admit-
ted that not all of his suppositions were necessarily true even if they 
were clear in themselves (ex se patent); rather they were conjectural, 
based on common agreement and sensible signs.
e suppositions are clear of themselves; ﬁrst they derive out of common agree-
ment and experience, since signs and traces of an inundation appear in mountain-
ous regions, such as seashells and oysters, so that we should reasonably arrive at 
the conjecture that when there was a universal ﬂood it covered and surpassed all 
of the mountains.49
e key is that signs and traces, based on experience, lead to con-
jectures that then become the basis for premises in deductive argu-
ments. e deductive arguments, however, are only as sound as the 
conjectures upon which they are based. 
qualis est scientia mathematica, est tamen scientia propter quid: quia inventio cau-
sae, quae habetur per syllogismum coniecturalem, est propter quid eﬀectus. Per haec 
delentur obiectiones, quae contra haec ﬁeri solent: Prima quidem delentur ex eo, quia 
non est circulus in demonstratione, cum primus processus sit tantum syllogismus, se-
cundus vero demonstratio propter quid. Deletur etiam secunda obiectio, quia eﬀectus 
semper est notior ipsa causa in genere notitiae quia est. Nunquam enim causa potest 
esse ita certa quia est, sicut eﬀectus, cuius esse est ad sensum notum. Ipsum vero quia 
est causae, est coniecturale, utrum tale esse coniecturale est notius ipso eﬀectu, in ge-
nere notitiae propter quid. Nam posita inventione causae, semper scitur propter quid 
eﬀectus. unde & Aristo[teles], in libro Meteororum concedit se non tradidisse veras 
causas eﬀectuum naturalium, sed quo erat sibi possibile coniecturabiliter.”
49) Tiberio Russilano, Apologeticus adversus cucullatos, ed. Luigi De France (Cosenza, 
1991), 154: “Suppositiones autem ex se patent; prima quidem ex communi consensu 
et experientia, cum in locis montuosis signa adhuc inundationis appareant atque ves-
tigia, ut conchae et ostrea, ut deveniamus iure in coniecturam quandoque diluvium 
fuisse universale, montuosa quaecumque cooperiens ac tegens.”
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Since the time of Pierre Duhem, the epistemological standard of 
“saving the appearances” has been used to distinguish the astronom-
ical science from cosmology and terrestrial physics.50 As Peter Barker 
and Bernard Goldstein have argued, the epistemological goal of 
“saving the appearances” was meant to give demonstratio quia while 
admitting the impossibility of demonstratio propter quid. 51 While 
for astronomy the limitations on certainty result from the mathe-
matically indistinguishable nature of starting principles and the inabil-
ity to observe accurately celestial bodies, for meteorology the 
limitation comes from the accidental nature of meteorological phe-
nomena. Lodovico Boccadiferro, a professor of natural philosophy 
at Bologna in the period 1527-1545, who had studied with Pom-
ponazzi, perhaps gave the clearest summation: “is law must be 
observed: that when the causes of some eﬀects are unknown to us, 
we must accept suppositions, or principles, from which nothing 
impossible, nothing contrary to the senses, and nothing repugnant 
to the appearances follows.” Boccadiferro admitted that this “con-
tingent possible proposition is that which is not true, but could be 
true.”52 us the epistemological standard for meteorology fell far 
below that of certain truth; and the goal of “saving the appearances” 
should not be taken to be characteristic only of astronomy but for 
some parts of natural philosophy as well.
50) Pierre Duhem, SOZEIN TA PHAINOMENA, essai sur la notion de théorie physique 
de Platon à Galilée (Paris, 1908). 
51) Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, “Realism and Instrumentalism in Six-
teenth-Century Astronomy,” Perspectives on Science 6 (1998), 232-258. 
52) Lodovico Boccadiferro, Lectiones super primum librum Meteorologicorum Aristotelis 
(Venice, 1565), fol. 45v-46r: “Et lex observanda est ista, quod cum causae alicuius ef-
fectus sunt nobis ignotae, debemus accipere suppositiones, aut principia, ex quibus 
nihil impossibile sequatur, neque contra sensum, neque apparentibus repugnans … . 
Propositio possibilis contingens est illa quae non est vera, sed potest esse vera, ut ha-
betur primo priorum. & Averr. hoc contingens appellat inventum, & contingens & 
possibile … .”
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Observations, eory, and Revisions
e contention that meteorological theory was conjectural and at 
times only capable of saving the appearances was widely known 
among those concerned with this ﬁeld in the sixteenth century. 
Moreover, this contention justiﬁed the application of new observa-
tions to the ﬁeld, which could be used as signs to correct Aristot-
le’s own theory. For example, a number of Aristotelians as early as 
the 1520s used the observations of sailors to amend Aristotle’s posi-
tion that there was an uninhabitable torrid zone in the area around 
the equator.53 Moreover, Vimercati contended that, contrary to Aris-
totle, Portuguese sailors and Columbus had observed ﬂows in the 
Atlantic Ocean, which had caused their return trips to be of diﬀer-
ent lengths than their departing voyages.54 Zabarella utilized his 
experience of being upon Monte Venda, outside of Padua, on a day 
when it rained in the lowlands but did not on the mountaintop to 
conclude that he had observed the “middle region” of air, i.e., the 
region above the clouds. From his observations, he concluded, against 
Aristotle, that this region is composed of normal air, not exhala-
tions.55
 One of the most common topics where authors took into account 
the application of newly observed signs was in explanations of earth-
quakes. Not only had Aristotle’s treatment included an extremely 
lengthy discussion of signs, but a number of his observations and 
generalization did not conform to the experiences of those who 
lived in the sixteenth century. Lucio Maggio, a self-described  Bolognese 
gentil’huomo who authored a dialogue dedicated to explaining the 
53) Craig Martin, “Experience of the New World and Aristotelian Revisions of the 
Earth’s Climates during the Renaissance,” History of Meteorology 3 (2006), 1-15. 
54) Aristotle, Meteorology, 354a20; Francesco Vimercati, In quatuor libros Aristotelis 
Meteorologicorum commentarii (Paris, 1556), 176: “Observatus vero est & alius in mari 
ﬂuxus, tum in Mediterraneo, tum in Oceano, quo videlicet ﬂuit ab ortu ad occasum, 
& in Mediterraneo rursus ad ortum reﬂuit, quomodo etiam in sinu illius Adriatico. 
Quem ﬂuxum, etsi non evidentem, observaverunt tamen nautae ex itineribus, quae 
breviori tempore conﬁciunt, cum ab ortu ad occasum navigant, quam cum ab occasu 
ad ortum, aquae ﬂuxu navium motum aut adiuvante, aut impediente.”
55) Giacomo Zabarella, De rebus naturalibus libri xxx (Venice, 1590), 386-387. See 
Charles B. Schmitt, “Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella’s View 
with Galileo’s in De Motu,” Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969), 80-138, at 98-100.
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earthquakes that struck Ferrara in 1570, followed Aristotle’s general 
explanation based on underground exhalations and winds but dis-
agreed with particular details of Aristotle’s account. He credited 
Aristotle himself with having developed a limited epistemological 
goal for meteorology: “Aristotle did not tell a lie saying that of 
those things that are hardly clear to the senses, we demonstrate 
appropriately if by reasoning about these matters we deduce some 
causes that are not contrary to the eﬀects.”56 Maggio’s primary inten-
tion was to demonstrate the natural origins of the Ferrarese earth-
quakes in order to dispute Pope Pius V’s claim that the earthquakes 
resulted from divine anger over Ferrara’s hospitable treatment of its 
large Jewish population,57 so he attempted to demonstrate that all 
of the particulars of this earthquake were not beyond the under-
standing of natural philosophy even if they did not correspond to 
exactly what was found in Aristotle. e fact that the Ferrarese 
earthquakes began in November is taken as evidence that Aristot-
le’s contention that earthquakes most often occur in winter during 
tranquil weather at night should not be understood as a uniform 
rule.58 Other observations were put to the service of upholding Aris-
totle’s contention that earthquakes occur in locales where the earth 
is porous and hollow.59 Maggio asserted that the Ferrarese terrain 
contains “holes, pores, caverns, and subterranean passages” that are 
typically ﬁlled with water. e untypically warm summer and autumn, 
however, dried out these pores, which Maggio wrote he had observed. 
e heat rendered the passages “deprived of their usual humor,” 
thereby allowing the earthquake-inducing exhalation to enter and 
subsequently to cause tremors.60
56) Lucio Maggio, Del terremoto dialogo del Signor Lucio Maggio gentil’huomo bolognese 
(Bologna, 1571), fol. 56v: “ho havuto sommo piacere di vegghiare, & considerare, che 
Aristotele non disse la bugia dicendo che di queste cose poco manifeste al senso con-
venientemente demostriamo se ragionandone adduciamo alcune cause che non siano 
agli eﬀetti contrarie.”
57) Emanuela Guidoboni, “Riti di calamità: Terremoti a Ferrara nel 1570-1574,” 
Quaderni Storici, n.s. 55 (1984), 107-135.
58) Maggio, Del terremoto, fol. 44r.
59) Aristotle, Meteorology, 366a24-26. 
60) Maggio, Del terremoto, fol. 34v-35r: “Ma tornando là donde ci partimmo dico, che 
il terreno Ferrarese come molti altri, contiene in se meati, pori, caverne, & vie sotter-
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Discussions such as Maggio’s remained present within the com-
mentary tradition on Aristotle’s Meteorology during the seventeenth 
century. Niccolò Cabeo, a Jesuit originally from Ferrara, empha-
sized experience and chymical experimentation in his 1646 com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology.61 Similarly to Maggio, he noted 
approvingly that Aristotle used the ﬁrst stage of the regressus method 
in the analysis of earthquakes, “He [Aristotle] began well, as I have 
said, in trying to show a posteriori, or rather by the methodus reso-
lutoria, what is the cause assigned to earthquakes.”62 For Cabeo, 
however, Aristotle’s attempts were insuﬃcient and his theory was 
unable to explain the real cause of earthquakes. Experience and 
observations taken from recent earthquakes support a chymical expla-
nation. Instead of maintaining that winds or the eruption of sub-
terranean exhalations provoked tremors, Cabeo believed that 
earthquakes result when veins of ﬂammable substances such as sul-
fur, bitumen, and niter ignite.63 is theory is supported by a  number 
of observations, or arguments a posteriori. e earth in the area 
around Ferrara, which had been struck by earthquakes again in 
1625 and 1636, for example, is full of niter, conﬁrmed by the red 
ranee, dove si generano l’acque, & per le quali l’acque delle pioggie, & del Pò, van-
no penetrando, & lo rendono humido… . Hora essendo stato grandissimo caldo, & 
siccità del mese di Luglio ﬁno à i dodici di Novembre, che non cadde mai tanta ac-
qua dal cielo, che se bagnasse la polvere, & essendo passato tutto queltempo, senza 
che mai piovesse, si come in quei tempi essendo il Signor Mattio in Ferrrar per servi-
gio del’Illustrissimo Signor Cardinale Paleotti, & io del Signor Prencipe osservammo 
insieme, & più volte discoremmo sopra quel la straordinaria sicittà, per la quale era-
no secchi i ﬁumi, i pozzi, & ogni humore, si sono sempre per lo secco fatte maggiori 
le caverne, i pori, & meati della terra, & restando asciute, & prive del solito humore, 
doveano empirsi di alcuna cosa, percha la natura, come sapete, non comporta il va-
cuo … .”
61) Craig Martin, “With Aristotelians like ese, Who Needs anti-Aristotelians? 
Chymical Corpuscular Matter eory in Niccolò Cabeo’s Meteorology,” Early Science 
and Medicine 11 (2006), 135-161. 
62) Niccolò Cabeo, Commentaria in libros Meteorologicorum (Rome, 1646), II, 246: 
“Incipit, ut dixi, probare a posteriori, seu potius Methodo resolutoria, ostendere, bene 
assigatam esse causam terraemotus.”
63) Ibid., II, 243. e idea that the causes of earthquakes were chymical did not 
 originate with Cabeo, see: Georgius Agricola, De ortu et causis subterraneorum libri V 
(Basel, 1558), 31-32.
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color of the local well-water.64 e 1636 earthquake provided Cabeo 
the opportunity to witness the ﬂow of these waters that were accom-
panied by burning fumes.65 No winds, however, were seen escaping 
from the newly created gashes in the ground. Moreover the numer-
ous earthquakes that occur in the region around Vesuvius, a region 
famed for volcanic eruptions, spontaneous ﬁres, and bituminous 
soil, are signs of the correctness of Cabeo’s general theory.66 us 
according to Cabeo, Aristotle’s general method of arguing from 
eﬀects to causes leads to chymical theories that Aristotle himself 
did not endorse.
Conclusion
e distinction between theories of scientiﬁc knowledge and prac-
tice is necessary for historical understandings of Renaissance natu-
ral philosophy. While epistemological ideals played a role in the 
presentation of concepts and guided the direction of natural phi-
losophy, they should not be mistaken for actual methods of research. 
Palmieri rightfully distinguishes Zabarella’s logic from the paths fol-
lowed in his treatises on cosmology and nature. Nevertheless, the 
methodus resolutiva, with its emphasis on using experience to mod-
ify and create provisional theories, guided Renaissance thinkers. While 
certainty was the ideal for syllogistic knowledge, Renaissance com-
mentators on the Meteorology recognized that the intractable nature 
of the ﬁeld, the diﬃculty of accurate observations, the inaccessibil-
ity of many of the subjects, and the accidental nature of material 
causes rendered much of meteorology conjectural. Observations could 
lead to new theories, departures from Aristotle’s own positions, which 
would not be certain but strive to correspond to observable natu-
ral eﬀects.
64) Cabeo, Commentaria, II:243. 
65) Ibid., II:248. 
66) Ibid., II:249. e sulfuric, bituminous, and nitric nature of the area around Ve-
suvius was widely noted by observers of its 1631 eruption and before. E.g., Giovan-
ni Francesco Porrata Spinola, Discorso sopra l’origine de’ fuochi gettati dal Monte Veseuo 
(Lecce, 1632), 4; Simone Porzio, De conﬂagratione agri Puteolani… Epistola (Florence, 
1551), 6. 
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e intractability of meteorology led authors to proofs within 
the ﬁeld, not as demonstrative in a strict sense, but as dialectical, 
or, for Pomponazzi, even as rhetorical. Recognition that Aristotle’s 
arguments were probable or approached verisimilitude extended not 
just to the portions of the ﬁeld that were especially diﬃcult but its 
foundations as well. For example, two Franciscans, Bartolomeo Mas-
tri and and Bonaventura Belluti, while agreeing with Aristotle that 
there were four elements, found Aristotle’s arguments not demon-
strative but rather probable in their 1640 disputations on meteo-
rology.67 Natural philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition realized 
that while scientia required syllogism, the probable arguments of 
dialectic were at times the only available solution for discussions of 
the natural world. 
While natural philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies might have found new impetus in humanism and latitudi-
narianism for endorsing the belief that natural philosophy was 
composed of probable knowledge, that belief was not foreign to 
Aristotelian natural philosophy. When Claude Bérigard, a professor 
at Pisa and then Padua, wrote in his 1661 Circulus pisanus that 
Aristotle spoke correctly that every opinion of natural philosophy 
was “nothing other than a hypothesis,” that could help solve diﬃ-
culties just “as was the custom in the science of the stars, which 
puts forth epicycles, concentrics, and eccentrics,” he was following 
a long Aristotelian tradition rather than undermining it by casting 
doubts.68 us Athanasius Kircher’s probabilism found in the  Mundus 
67) Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluti, Disputationes in libros de celo et Meth-
eoris (Venice, 1640), 203: “Numerus elementorum, quamvis varius fuerit apud An-
tiquos, ut dicitur in Phys. communiter tamen censetur esse quaternarius; verum est 
tamen, quod non datur ratio aliqua evidenter demonstrans elementa non esse plura, 
nec pauciora, & praesertim rationes Arist. sunt probabiles… .”
68) Claude Bérigard, Circulus pisanus… veteri et peripatetica philosphia in Aristotelis li-
bros de octo Physicorum. Quatuor de Coelo. Duos de Ortu & interitu. Quatuor de Me-
teoris, & tres de Anima (Padua, 1661), 19: “Haec ratio iam nihil concludit, sed nos 
remittit ad discutiendas totius Physicae diﬃcultates, ut tandem constet an eas dirimat 
accuratius Aristoteles, an antiqui: & vere opinio cuiuscunque philosophi nihil est aliud 
quam hypothesis, qua posita videndum est an facilius enodentur omnes diﬃcultates 
scientiae naturalis, ut ﬁeri solet in Astrologia quae varios statuit epicyclos, concentri-
cos & eccentricos, ut iis quae apparent in coelo respondeatur: sic arbitrandum est de 
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subterraneus (1665), a work that is largely meteorological, at least 
partially exhibits continuity with the Aristotelian tradition in addi-
tion to being an example of Jesuit endorsement of this epistemic 
standard.69 Aristotelians recognized that natural philosophy dealt 
with contingencies and that its theories were dialectical and there-
fore uncertain. e imperfections of the matter of the sublunary 
regions and our inability to observe accurately the eﬀects of this 
matter, made Aristotelians recognize that knowledge of nature was 
incomplete and probable. If indeed there was a major shift during 
the seventeenth century, it was the broader endorsement of the 
uncertainty or inconclusiveness of metaphysics rather than the adop-
tion of the idea that natural philosophy provided probable knowl-
edge.
opinione Aristotelis & antiquorum, nec ante sententiam ferre oportet, quam prae-
cipuis dubitationibus responsum fuerit.” Cf. Paolo Marangon, “Aristotelismo e car-
tesianesimo: Filosoﬁa accademica e libertini,” in Storia della cultura veneta (Vicenza, 
1984), IV.2, 95-114. 
69) Mark A. Waddell, “e World as it Might Be: Iconography and Probabilism in the 
Mundus subterraneus of Athanasius Kircher,” Centaurus 48 (2006), 3-22.
